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PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST PoLICY. Edited by Almarin Phillips.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1965. Pp. ix, 454. $9.00.
Has Congress established an antitrust policy for the United
States? Have the so-called "antitrust 1aws"1 preserved and promoted
competition? In the seventy-five years which have followed the
adoption of the first federal statute purportedly directed at thwarting restraints of trade and preventing monopoly, have the courts
formulated a body of legal principles which clearly prescribe the
business activities which the antitrust laws prohibit? Many students
of antitrust law have taken the position that a negative answer
must be given to these inquiries. They feel not only that the antitrust statutes have failed to promote a competitive business environment, 2 but also that the administrative agencies have not consistently taken cognizance of the supposed objectives of these laws
1. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1•7
(1964); Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13, 14-21, 22-27,
29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1964); Celler-Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1964); Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-136,
21a (1964); Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C,
§§ 41-58 (1964). The prime objective of the Celler-Kefauver Act was to amend the
Clayton Act so that the latter would prohibit certain business activities that previously did not fall within the condemnation of the act. For the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act and its objectives,
see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). Although the act
took the form of an amendment to the Clayton Act, it has been repeatedly referred
to as the Celler-Kefauver Act rather than as a part of the Clayton Act, The same
procedure is followed in the course of this review.
2. For example, the purported objective of the Robinson-Patman amendment to
the Clayton Act was to prohibit price discrimination which impaired competition.
Whether the act was intended to foster competition or protect competitors is subject
to debate. See generally BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATlllAN Acr (1964).
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while discharging their duties with respect to overseeing various
segments of the nation's economy.3 The upshot of this legal environment is that businessmen, even when aided by competent
legal counsel, cannot accurately forecast whether a planned merger
or other activity will later be declared violative of our antitrust
laws. 4
Admittedly, benefits would inure to businessmen, as well as to
other members of our society, if Congress and the courts clearly
stated all the kinds of business activities that are prohibited by
those acts of Congress collectively known as the antitrust Iaws.5
However, the failure of the legislative and judicial branches of
the federal government to announce succinctly the mandates of
the law does not necessarily mean that they have been derelict in
the performance of their duties. If each of these branches of the
government directed its efforts toward tabulating once and for all
a complete list of commercial activities which were to be treated
as anathema to the economic well-being of the nation, would such
an objective be attainable? In the milieu in which business must
operate, such a goal seems unrealistic. Ours is a dynamic environment in which there is an ever-changing attitude toward the roles
of government, business, and labor.6 Propriety does not have fixed
meaning; the consensus of one day may be the minority or discarded
view of the next. Ideas as to what is good and what is bad appear,
often fluctuate, and in time disappear. National goals are multiple
rather than singular.7 In this setting, it is not surprising to find
that our statutory scheme and judicial determinations in the field
of antitrust are disjointed rather than symmetrical. Antitrust law
in 1965 can be appropriately described as lacking consistency and
being highly flexible, unsettled, and, to a degree, incomprehensible.8
Perspectives on Antitrust Policy is a collection of seventeen
essays. The essays, each of which constitutes a single chapter, were
initially presented as lectures in a series of weekly seminars held
at the School of Law of the University of Virginia during the spring

a

3. For a compact consideration of the extent to which federal, state, and local government activities in practice thwart the operation of the antitrust laws, see MAssEL,
COMPETlTION AND MONOPOLY

42·82 (1962).

4. This problem is extensively probed in chapters 15 and 17 of Perspectives.

5. A complete list of those business activities which are exempted by statute from
the antitrust law appears in Perspectives at 301-11.
6. The change in emphasis from equality of opportunity to economic security has
had a significant impact on the nature of the effort exerted by the government in giving a sense of direction to the nation's economy. The appeal and decline of laissez-faire
is clearly presented in FINE, l..AissEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELF.AllE STATE (1956). For
a current study of the nation's economic structure, see GINZBERG, HIESTAND, & REUBENS,
THE PLURALlSTIC

ECONOMY

(1965).

7. See, e.g., Report of the President's Commission on National Goals, in GoALS

FOR

1-31 (1960), in which fifteen distinct national goals are listed and analyzed.
8. Most of the authors whose writings appear in Perspectives presumably would

AMERICANS

subscribe to this characterization.
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semester of 1963. In a very short preface, the editor alludes to the
diversity of approach, the dissimilarity of areas of expertise, and
the differences of opinion of the contributors. He refers to the complexities of the antitrust laws and the absence of precisely defined
objectives. Mr. Phillips points out that the seventeen contributors
are apprehensive that neither legislators nor judges seem to
know exactly how best to shape the American economy so as to
promote individual, business, and national economic health and
growth. The editor views the themes which underly most of the
essays as enigmatic. Most of the authors ponder the questions
whether businessmen or the government should control the economic development of the nation and whether our antitrust laws
should seek to preserve competition or competitors.
The general tone of Perspectives is one of dissatisfaction with
the current state of the law. Most of the authors conclude that our
legislators and judges have missed the mark. Similarly condemned
are some of the policies of the Interstate Commerce Commission°
and the Federal Trade Commission,10 as well as such government
activities as the ·purchasing of materials and equipment and the use
of public funds to support research and development by private
industry.11 Except for the chapter12 in which, contrary to the import
of another chapter,13 the author writes in favor of continuing the
scope of the present exemption of organized labor from the antitrust laws, accolades in support of our antitrust policies are almost
entirely lacking. The bases of the discontent of these experts fall
into several distinct categories.
The Non-Economic Character of Our Antitrust Laws. Have the
congressmen who have written in support of and voted for our antitrust laws been motivated by a desire to attain certain economic
objectives, such as the efficient allocation of our nation's resources,
or have they been driven by such non-economic concepts as democratic idealism or the desire to gain the approbation, and thereby
_the votes, of their constituents? The goal of a country's economic
structure, according to traditional economic thought, is to utilize
the nation's human, natural, and capital resources most effectively
and at the least possible cost. According to the advocates of laissezfaire capitalism, this result can be brought about if the interaction
of supply and d,emand is the exclusive determinant of the manner
in which resources and capital are marshaled and used. Competition
is the only regulator of this kind of economic environment. Price,
assortment of products, and allocation of income and wealth are the
9. Ch. 11.
10. Ch. 1.
11. Ch. 12.
12. Ch. 16.
13. Ch. 13.
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result of the unrestricted interplay of each seller vying with every
other seller and each buyer pursuing'his own self-interest by seeking to obtain the most he can for what he offers in exchange.
The.contributors to Perspectives assert that our antitrust legislation is not sufficiently directed at attaining the best kind of economic environment for the nation.14 Instead, they insist, our laws
over-emphasize that aspect of the American psyche which favors a
society composed of many small businessmen rather than a small
number of large business organizations. Attacking our antitrust
laws on the ground that they fail to' deal with the problem which
they are purportedly designed to resolve, these writers contend that
in practice they often serve to deny the nation the economies of
large-scale business operations. Further argument is made that the
law in its present form serves to promote waste of the nation's resources and capital equipment by shielding economically inefficient
business enterprises from destruction; to the extent that the antitrust laws do not permit the untrammeled operation of those forces
which bring success to those businesses which make the greatest
contribution to the community and eliminate the least efficient
businessmen, the American people have been denied the advantages
inherent in an economy governed by unrestricted competition.
Support for the position that our laws · are in many instances
neither preserving nor promoting competition can be found in
legislation and judicial decisions. Patently, the Miller-Tydings Act15
and the McGuire Act,1 6 which exempt certain kinds of resale price
maintenance arrangements from the antitrust laws, may actually
stimulate anticompetitive behavior. Permitting manufacturers to
set the price at which all retailers must market the manufacturer's
merchandise protects an activity which is the antithesis of competitive conduct. For example, in applying the Robinson-Patman
Act the Supreme Court has held that a supplier violated the law by
charging a retailer a lower price than that demanded of other retailers in the same geographical area, even though the supplier was
motivated to make such an arrangement in order to assist the individual retailer to meet the price being charged by retailers of a
similar product.17 Indeed, the Court refused to ascribe any probative
14. E.g., chs. 1 &: 2.
15. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The Miller-Tydings Act
is an amendment to the Sherman Act.
16. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964). The McGuire Act ,is
an amendment to the Federal Trade Com.mission Act.
17. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963). The anomalous situation which has
xesulted under ,the Miller-Tydings Act and McGuire Act is illustrated by the xesult
arrived at in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), where the Court indicated
that a manufacturer's efforts to maintain the xesale price violated the Sherman Act if
it failed to come within the exemption contained in the McGuire Act.
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value whatever to that motivation. 18 In arriving at its determination,
the Court directed its attention to the impact of such a practice on
the other retailers who sold the supplier's product rather than to the
benefits which might inure to consumers by the reduction in price
granted to meet competition.
The foregoing is illustrative of one of the facets of antitrust policy which the essayists in Perspectives find objectionable. Such prescribed norms are viewed as manifestations of an impulse to satisfy
non-economic goals under the guise of preserving and promoting
competition. According to these essayists, the neglect clearly to
identify and distinguish economics from matters of a different nature has resulted in the formulation of a body of legal rules which
have hamstrung, rather than stimulated, our economy.
Size and Power Rather Than Economic Impact as the Test of
Illegality. The question is presented whether the size of a business
organization, without regard to the characteristics of the particular
segment of the economy in which it functions, is a proper standard
to invoke in determining the illegality of certain kinds of action.
The Sherman Act, on its face, condemns certain kinds of activities
without any regard to whether the pattern of conduct in issue is in
fact detrimental to competition.19 The Clayton Act declares that
certain behavior is illegal if it tends to lessen competition substantially or to create a monopoly. 20 In Perspectives, it is argued that
the current tendency of the courts to· apply these laws on a per se
basis of unlawfulness, rather than on a. test of reasonableness under
the circumstances, is injurious to American business as well as to
competition.21
18. The Court held that the good faith defense to price discrimination contained
in § 2b of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, which permits
the lowering of prices to meet competition, was applicable only to horizontal and not
to vertical competition.,
19. Section 1 of tlle act provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or othenvise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.'' Section 2 pro•
vides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor ••• .'' Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
20. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, prior to the Celler-Kefauver amendment, read
in part as follows: "That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire • • • the
whole or any part of the stock ••• of another corporation ••• where the effect of such
acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose
stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce.'' Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). As amended, the section
reads: "That no corporation ••• shall acquire •.• the whole or any part of the stock
••• or any part of the assets of another corporation ••• where in any line of com•
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly••• .'' Celler-Kefauver Act, ch.
1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
21. See, e.g., ch. I.
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Over the years the Supreme Court has vacillated between two
approaches. At times the Court has employed a subjective frame of
reference-is the action in question, in this industry, reasonable? 22
At other times, it has resorted to an objective test, asking whether
a business which enjoys a given percentage of the market, or
whether a certain kind of activity, in and of itself, is violative of the
law.28
The examination made in this book of business mergers raises
the question of the propriety of applying antitrust concepts to vertical and conglomerate combinations.24 One of the authors concedes
that it may be consistent with sound eGonomic policy to prohibit
certain horizontal mergers. He insists, however, that there is a very
serious doubt as to whether a strong case can be made in economic
terms to apply the mandates of the antitrust laws to vertical mergers
and to conglomerate combinations.25 Why, then, have the courts applied antitrllst policies to vertical combinations and why liave some
courts insisted that our antitrust laws should be applied to conglomerate combinations as well? It is suggested that the answer
may be found for the most part in the fear which many Americans
have of bigness, power, and the mere presence of power in the market place. Inhibiting vertical and conglomerate mergers undoubtedly impedes the substitution of big business for small business.
This result is consistent with the attitude that our national interests will best be served by the latter rather than the former type of
business structure.
The Sherman Act declares that a monopoly is illegal per se. Except for those sectors of the economy where monopoly is protected
by law, the bare possession of monopoly power is unlawful without
regard to the manner in which it is used. One of the purported objectives of the Clayton Act is "to nip monopoly in the bud."26 In
Perspectives this per se approach is depicted as unrealistic. The
proposition that a monopolistic situation once established will remain unless abated by government action is rejected as fallacious. It
is urged that, in our ever changing economic environment, monopo22. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). See also United States v. First Nat'l
Bank 8: Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1964).
24. See chs. 2, 4, 8: 8.
25. Ch. 8. For a discussion of the circumstances under which conglomerate mergers
should be struck down under the Celler-Kefauver Act, see Turner, Conglomerate
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAR.v. L. REv. 1313 (1965). Professor
Turner is now the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice.
26. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953). See also
United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours 8: Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957).
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lies will in time fade, their products replaced by the offerings of
others in the market place.21
Of all of the attacks which the authors hurl at the current status
of the antitrust laws, that condemning the current approach to
monopoly seems to be the least tenable. It fails to take cognizance
of the fact that monopolists do not simply stand by and permit
others to invade their domain of dominance. While history is replete with illustrations of monopolies being broken up, monopoly
power being curbed, and potential monopolists being deterred by
governmental action from expanding the realm of their omnipotence,
one would indeed be hard pressed to find many instances where,
absent such action, monopolists were overwhelmed by newcomers
in the market place. Admittedly, changes in technology may have
an adverse effect on an existing monopoly. However, mote often
than not, the monopolist may be better equipped to utilize the
fruits of change because of his position in the market place. The
realities of life seem to strengthen, rather than erode, established
monopolies.
Exemptions From Antitrust Laws. Are certain actors in the market place improperly exempted from the commands of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts? Is there something sacrosanct about labor, transportation, insurance or those other participants in the market place
which the law frees from the usual mandates of antitrust policy?
Perspectives contains a cross-section of opinion in regard to this
anomalistic feature of the law. 28 The breadth of the immunity of
labor from the Sherman and Clayton Acts is defended in one chapter29 and 9bjected to in another.30 One author insists that section 14
(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which permits states to enact so-called
"right to work laws," should be retained; another argues for its repeal. A chapter devoted to the transportation industry concludes
that the- regulators charged with overseeing this industry have become to an extent the protectors, rather than the policemen, of
those whom they are charged with policing.31 The author of this
chapter of the book concludes that, because of administrative policies,
the American people are being denied the benefits of competition
in this sphere of the economy. As he views this sector, it is more
protected than regulated.
· The Torment of Uncertainty. Another one of the themes underlying this work is the lack of certainty in antitrust law. Both the reversal of previous positions, with the resulting inability of lawyers
to predict with a reasonable quantum of confidence how a court
27.
28.
29,
30.
31.

Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.

4.
12 deals exclusively with the question of exemptions,
16,
13.
ll.
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will rule in regard to a particular business procedure, and the drag
on decision-making by businessmen caused by the lack of an adequate basis upon which it can be determined whether a particular
activity will later be declared unlawful are aspects of the current
antitrust picture which are censured by several of the authors.32
While there is merit in the criticism that these conditions are symbolic of a basic defect in our antitrust laws, is there a remedy? The
authors' proposals that greater attention be paid to the laissez-faire
dogma, that government policies be more consistently applied, and
that exemptions from antitrust laws, regardless of how well-intended, be eliminated, fail to take into consideration the total environment in which American business must operate. Are the inconsistency, the floundering, and the lack of clarity really avoidable?
While certainty and precision would indeed be desirable, is it reasonable to expect a simple, readily ascertainable, and settled set of norms
in an area of human endeavor which itself is anything but static?
As business objectives change, as new techniques appear and old
ones vanish, as innovations give rise to formerly unforeseen·kinds of
human activity, and as societal desiderata are modified, the law
governing business arrangements must likewise change. It is this
ability to change the commands of the law to meet the requirements generated by new events which has been commended as one
of the strongest aspects of our legal system. Even a. cursory examination of the current contents of our criminal law or the law governing civil rights reveals that fundamental changes have been made
in these areas within the past decade. The same can be said for
other segments of the law.
There is nothing unique about American business which will
permit our antitrust laws to be reduced to an immutable set ·of
standards. Ours is essentially an unstable economic environment,
one which at times may even be described as volatile. In such an
atmosphere it is constantly necessary to alter prescribed norms to
meet the exigencies of change. Would the economy and the nation's
businessmen have fared as well as they have if our antitrust policies had too little resiliency? Some of the essayists might be taken
to task for their failure to applaud, however mildly, the overall
willingness of the courts and Congress to change the law to meet.
the needs of our society.
Among the most notable features of Perspectives is its latitude.
The material very beneficially forces the reader to think in terms
of the total picture rather than individual aspects of a complex
problem. It rejects a "cubbyhole" approach. Illustrative of the scope
of the volume is the chapter entitled "The Influence of Interna32. Special consideration is given to this question in chapter 17, which is entitled
The Impact of Antitrust Law on Corporate Management.
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tional Factors," written by Kingman Brewster, Jr., in which the
author compares the different standards of propriety enforced by
the courts in regard to domestic and foreign commerce. 88 With the
increased significance of international trade in our economic life,
this section of the book can prove especially helpful to those who
have previously directed their attention exclusively to the domestic
side of antitrust policies.
A reader who is already familiar with antitrust law will find that
this book will broaden his horizons. After completing his reading
he will probably feel compelled to re-evaluate his prior personal appraisal of current antitrust policies. Those who are specialists in one
or tw-o spheres of antitrust law will find that they will return to their
areas of concentration with new insights gained from having studied
those chapters which delve into matters beyond their own immediate
interest. For the neophyte, this volume can prove to be an especially
helpful introduction to the field. The prime purpose of the authors
is to shed light on fundamental concepts and dilemmas rather than
to explore minutia, subtle niceties, and distinctions which more
often than not serve to confuse, rather than edify, the newcomer.
This volume, like others which undertake the study of a portion
of the law in the throes of adapting to change, is somewhat dated.
New material would have to be added to make this work entirely
current. However, this factor does not detract from the exemplary
manner in which this collection of essays deals with the problem of
achieving the kind of economy to which our nation aspires. Those
who have already read this book, as well as those who will do so in
the future, would undoubtedly welcome to their library an expanded and up-to-date edition of Perspectives, on the condition that
it contain the same kind of breadth of treatment, depth of perception, and the touch of the polemic found in its predecessor. I for one
would like to see how the same authors would treat the recent
Supreme Court decisions relating to joint ventures,34 reciprocity,au
and potential competition.86 It would indeed be pleasant to learn
that in the immediate future the authors who contributed to Perspectives will undertake such a task.

Edwin W. Tucker,
Assistant Professor of
Business Law,
The University of Connecticut
33. Ch. 14.
34. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
35. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
36. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).

